In the wake of the announcement of a Kenyan police-security deployment to Haiti, public attention to the crisis the country is facing shifted from general appeals for multilateral action to concerns that the Kenyan deployment would not resolve the crisis—simultaneously debating the logic of a fourth international intervention in a span of three decades. A common variable throughout is that the crisis in Haiti is deepening, and that even with some conditionalities, most Haitians desperately want outside help.
Few expect that sending a new international “reaction force” to Haiti will solve the country’s problems more than the United States and international efforts in the past—yet none can afford to do nothing—for good conscience or political expediency.
[International] efforts are not sustainable without a credible Haitian political consensus in place. Hence, a policy disconnect persists between multilateral diplomacy and street-level reality.
If there is a consensus among most of Haiti’s political factions and, belatedly, among much of the international community, it is that rushing toward elections in 2022 is unrealistic and simply dangerous for both voters and candidates. To hold a credible vote, Haiti’s leaders will have to work against the shaky track record of the past three decades.
A New York Times report on Sunday uncovered new details about the July 7 assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse.
Haiti has seen three major crises within the past four months. Amid these crises, everyday life in Haiti has become increasingly dangerous.
On Saturday, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake—more powerful than the 7.0 magnitude quake that savaged the country in 2010, killing nearly 200,000 and causing billions of dollars worth of damage—struck Haiti, killing over 2000 people, injuring at least 12,000 more, and leaving hundreds missing.