In 2017, with support from the Ford Foundation, Global Americans convened a High-Level Working Group on Inter-American Relations and Bipartisanship, comprising former policymakers, business leaders, civil society leaders and scholars, to discuss bipartisan and cross-regional ways that the current U.S. administration can build and improve upon the achievements of the past two decades of inter-American relations.
Our group, representing civil society, academia, and the policymaking and business communities in the U.S., Latin America and the Caribbean, has produced an initial series of papers laying out members’ consensus opinions on the topics of:
- Economic integration and trade
- Combating organized crime and narcotics trafficking
- Greater U.S.-Latin American collaboration on anti-corruption
- Expanding and improving education exchanges in the Americas
- Extra-hemispheric actors
Future topics will include rebuilding Venezuela and re-thinking development assistance.
The initial set of policy topics addressed by the working group reflects a long-standing hemispheric and bipartisan consensus on the key areas that have helped to secure U.S. and hemispheric economic, diplomatic and security interests. All of these topics are inter-related. But rather than address them collectively, we decided to narrow our focus to specific, constructive, and actionable issues and recommendations.
Convinced that the countries of the Americas will be able to solve their shared challenges only through collaboration, the members of our high-level working group have made a series of recommendations on each of the topics outlined above. We urge our governments, members of civil society, the media, the private sector, academia, and citizens of the Americas to consider them as a framework for charting the way forward.
This paper addresses how the region can address both the opportunities and challenges posed by the growing economic and political influence of countries from outside the hemisphere. Working collectively, the region can define a new agenda that will advance our shared democratic values, reinforce our commitment to responsible and sustainable economic development, and strengthen international norms—while also benefiting from the growing diversity of global markets and demand.
In recent years, nations from outside the hemisphere, particularly China and Russia, have increased their economic and political presence in the hemisphere, though their relations and interests vary.
China’s rapidly expanding economy and its growing demand for goods and services have presented Latin American economies and companies with opportunities to increase and diversify their markets, contributing to high rates of economic growth. Chinese trade with Latin America has grown from $12 billion at the turn of the 21st Century to $218 billion by 2013. The region’s exports to China grew by 23 percent. Meanwhile, imports to the U.S. from South and Central America have declined by 39 percent since 2011.
This increased economic presence has also been accompanied by more active Chinese diplomatic engagement in the region and rising investment. China now surpasses both the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank as the region’s top lender—providing over $140 billion in financing since 2005, most of which was dedicated to energy and infrastructure projects. Additionally, the China-CELAC 2015-2019 Cooperation agreement created three “cooperation” funds totaling $40 billion that provide an additional avenue for Chinese credit to the region.
More recently, at the January 2018 CELAC meeting in Santiago, Chile, China invited members from the region to join its “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) initiative, which “aims to create the world’s largest platform for economic cooperation, including policy coordination, trade and financing collaboration, and social and cultural cooperation.”
Soft-power (or as some have started to refer to it “sharp power” because it is so targeted to increase geostrategic interests) and public diplomacy initiatives have been another element of China’s increased efforts to gain influence in Latin America. Programs which foster cooperation between institutions as well as personal exchanges are now among the PRC’s most deployed soft/sharp-power tools. While visiting Peru in 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that his country would expand the number of training opportunities to 10,000 Latin Americans over the next three years. China has also committed to providing CELAC countries with 6,000 governmental scholarships, 6,000 training opportunities, and 400 opportunities for on-the-job master programs by 2019. In recent years, the number of foreign students enrolled in programs in China increased from 84,000 to 377,000, and the government plans to increase the number to 500,000 students by 2020.
Russia’s economic activities in the region are more limited, and focus on a narrower set of issues and countries. Russia has, for example, extended loans to cash-strapped Venezuela and, in the process, gained an equity stake in CITGO, a subsidiary of Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA. Russia has also increased its sale of military equipment to the region. Moscow recently launched the Spanish version of Russia Today (RT), the State media source linked to misinformation activities and fake news in the United States and internationally.
By the end of 2016, RT in Spanish was available in almost every Latin American country, and 327 TV cable providers now offer RT in Spanish as a separate channel to its subscribers. The RT in Spanish YouTube Channel is reported to have almost 4.5 monthly million viewers and approximately 400,000 subscribers. Concerns have also been raised over potential Russian meddling in the 2018 elections in Mexico, Colombia and Brazil.
At the same time, the hemispheric role and the soft power, public diplomacy and nation-brand footprints of the U.S. across the Americas are perceived by many to be diminished. Many ambassadorships and high-level positions in the State Department responsible for managing U.S. relations with the hemisphere remain unfilled, and President Trump and his administration have repeatedly spurned the region, most recently by the president skipping the Summit of the Americas in Lima. Unlike its two global rivals, the U.S. appears to be downsizing its soft-power strategies as China actively nurtures an image that invites Latin American countries to view it as their next business partner.
This matters economically:
- Since 2005, China has surpassed the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, combined, as the region’s top lender by providing over $140 billion primarily in energy and infrastructure projects.
- In seven Latin American countries, China has surpassed the United States as the main destination for exports, and in five of those countries—Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Peru, and Uruguay—China is now their largest export market.
- Meanwhile, since 2011, imports to the U.S. from South and Central America have declined by 39 percent, and NAFTA’s proposed renegotiation has shaken Mexico’s markets.
This paper addresses how the region can continue on the path of responsible development while meeting the opportunities and challenges presented by the growing economic and political influence of extra-hemispheric powers. We recognize that many American nations will naturally have national interests of their own in pursuing extra-hemispheric connections, whether individually—such as Brazil within the so-called BRICS nations—or collectively—as in the case of the Pacific Alliance (Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile) and hemispheric TPP nations (Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile), to mention a few examples.
Working collectively, the region needs to identify a new agenda that can protect our shared democratic values, reinforce our commitment to responsible and sustainable economic development and strengthen international norms and rights, even as we benefit from the growing diversity of global markets and demand.
With that in mind, here are a few priorities for this new agenda:
- The countries of the Americas should work together to adopt strategies to ensure sustained, equitable economic development through value-added production, including through the continued pursuit of regional trade agreements and discussions with the European Union and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The emergence of China as a major trading partner is good news for economies in need of diversity, but while opportunities for new investment are always welcome, they should come in alignment with our shared values of democracy, environmental protection, human rights, and cultural norms.
- The countries of the Americas should develop strong new incentives for transparent investment and opportunities for businesses and workers across the region.
- Given the new hemispheric competitive landscape, it makes sound economic and political sense to strengthen opportunities for intra-regional educational and people-to-people exchanges, both within Latin America and with the U.S.
- The region must move expeditiously to expand collaboration in the areas of cybersecurity and the development of defense contingency plans across the region, including with the U.S.
- The nations of the Americas should continue to work in pursuit of the strengthening of open societies, as a fundamental, shared paradigm for us all.
The political and economic activities of global powers like China and Russia vary with countries across the region, and their interests are different. China has become a major player and, in some cases, such as Chile and Uruguay, the number-one trade partner. It has emerged as a major investor in natural resource extraction projects in Brazil and Peru. At the same time, Beijing’s economic interests in Mexico, for example, have been minimal; though if the United States were to pull out of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it would leave a large vacuum in which China could expand its economic role.
While the relationship between China and the region remains largely economic and trade-based, with the rising Asian power showing little direct interest in sparking a rivalry with the United States, China’s diplomatic and soft power (though many have started to refer to the latter as “sharp power” given its apparent state-driven geostrategic intent) in the region is likely to increase as it engages with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which excludes the U.S. and Canada. Beijing has already invited the region to participate in its “One Belt One Road” initiative, which will assist in infrastructure investment and increase educational and cultural contacts and exchanges with students and leaders.
Russia’s activities and role in the region are more limited and focus on a narrower set of countries. Russia has extended loans to cash-strapped Venezuela and, in the process, gained an equity stake in CITGO, a subsidiary of the Venezuelan state oil company, PDVSA. Russia has also increased sales of military materiel to the region, increased its military and intelligence cooperation with Sandinista government in Nicaragua, and recently launched the Spanish version of Russia Today (RT), the state-funded outlet linked to the spreading of fake news and misinformation activities in the United States and internationally. Concerns have also been raised over potential Russian meddling in the 2018 elections in Mexico, Colombia and Brazil.
This also raises a critical point. In the next two years (2017-2019), 14 countries in the region will hold national presidential or legislative elections, affecting more than 600 million citizens. While the long-term impact and sustainability of the growing Chinese and Russian presence in the hemisphere is unclear, a responsible regional response, along with sustained U.S. leadership, is more important than ever. This includes consolidating and promoting international norms regarding fair trade and human rights, bolstering regional anti-corruption efforts, expanding people-to-people contacts and educational exchanges, and battling narcotics trafficking and organized crime.
The failure to improve and deepen intra-hemispheric trade relations, or to develop stronger trade relations with democracies outside the hemisphere, will increase the regional economic influence and potential political leverage of extra-Hemispheric actors who do not necessarily share the same values that the region has constructed and strengthened for decades.
China’s trade, investment, arms sales, and sharp power are all on the rise
China’s rapidly expanding economy and its growing demand for goods and services have presented Latin American economies and companies with an opportunity to increase and diversify their markets. Last year, the region’s exports to China grew by 23 percent. Meanwhile, imports to the U.S. from South and Central America have declined by 39 percent since 2011. Notably, in 2017 exports from Brazil to China grew by 37 percent; exports from Colombia to China increased by 60 percent; from Peru, they swelled by 26 percent. In seven Latin American countries, China has surpassed the United States as the main destination for exports, and in five of those countries—Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Peru, and Uruguay—China is now the largest export market.
China’s economic relationship with the region is largely centered around commodities, and most Chinese investment is focused on natural resources and extractive industries. Between 2011 and 2015, the top five LAC-China exports were soybeans (20 percent), iron ore and concentrates (16.8 percent), crude petroleum (11.8 percent), copper (11.4 percent), and copper ore (10 percent). Almost 60 percent of Chinese investments and acquisitions in Latin America are in extractive industries, although recently greenfield investments have branched out to additional sectors including manufacturing, finance, and utilities.
Export growth in other sectors to China from Latin America remains low, and most service exports are traded intra-regionally or with the U.S. and the European Union. There have also been a number of complaints by businesses about China’s lack of respect for intellectual property rights. Often, investors in China find that to enter the Chinese market they must engage in joint ventures or operate under arrangements that make it difficult for content creators to protect their intellectual property.
At the January 2018 CELAC meeting in the Chilean capital Santiago, China invited members from the region to join its “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) initiative. The initiative promotes Chinese investment in other countries’ economic development schemes and has financed important projects across the Middle East, Africa, southern Asia, Eastern Europe, and parts of Oceania (that includes Australia and Indonesia)—contributing to OBOR’s goal of establishing a “21st-century Maritime Silk Road.” For many Latin American countries and economies, increased investment in infrastructure is attractive. If China meets its promise, OBOR would fill the important need of international investment in a sector critical for the region’s economic development and political integration.
China has expanded its role as a creditor to the region, surpassing both the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank as the region’s top lender by providing over $140 billion in financing since 2005, most of which has been dedicated to energy and infrastructure projects. Venezuela is the region’s top borrower from China, and has 17 loans totaling $62.2 billion, followed by Brazil which has 10 loans totaling $36.8 billion, and Ecuador, which has 13 loans totaling $17.4 billion. These three countries represent 83 percent of total Chinese lending in the region. The loans have been offered exclusively through two state financial institutions, the China Development Bank and the country’s Export-Import Bank. Additionally, the China-CELAC 2015-2019 Cooperation agreement created three “cooperation” funds totaling $40 billion that provide an additional avenue for Chinese credit to the region.
China is also a growing regional supplier of arms. Between 2008 and 2016, it supplied Venezuela and Brazil with 14% and 8% of their total arms purchases respectively. The country is also the top arms supplier to Bolivia, providing it with over a third of the country’s total arms purchases, and PRC based conglomerates like NORINCO and AVIC now sell goods throughout the region ranging from radar to armored personnel carriers. The Chinese military has collaborated through training programs with U.S. allies in the region such as Colombia and Brazil. Certainly it is the prerogative of Latin American and Caribbean countries to purchase arms from non-U.S. sources especially if they are superior or cheaper; the fact that in some cases they do not involve conditionalities may also make these a likelier or more attractive source.
Last, but not least, China has increased its efforts to gain influence in Latin America through soft-power initiatives. One of the PRC’s most deployed soft-power tools is its people-to-people exchange initiatives, which invite cooperation between institutions as well as personal exchanges. While visiting Peru in 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that his country would expand the number of training opportunities to 10,000 Latin Americans over the next three years. The country has also pursued an initiative that invites Latin American elites to visit China free of charge. The visits aim to flatter participants by providing a highly structured experience.
Through China’s collaboration with CELAC, the PRC has also sought to attract more educational and cultural exchanges. Some of the most ambitious initiatives proposed in the China-CELAC agreement include an invitation to host 1,000 political leaders of CELAC countries in China by 2020, and a pledge to increase trade in a balanced and mutually beneficial way between China and CELAC countries to $500 billion, as well as raising the stock of reciprocal investment to at least $250 billion in the next ten years. Moreover, China has committed to providing CELAC countries with 6,000 government-subsidized scholarships, 6,000 training opportunities, and 400 opportunities for on-the-job master programs by 2019. Additionally, the “Bridge to the Future” program invites 100 young leaders from Latin America to China per year to participate in training programs and workshops, with the goal of gaining influence among Latin America’s elite; the program aims to host 1,000 young leaders by 2024.
Educational exchanges are critical to China’s sharp-power strategy. As of 2018, there are 39 Confucius Institutes and 19 Confucius classrooms across Latin America, with around 100,000 students enrolled in Chinese language programs. Public funding for international scholarships, particularly for students from developing nations, has increased dramatically. Official government estimates show that between 2004 and 2014, the number of foreign students enrolled in programs in China increased from 84,000 to 377,000. The Chinese government plans to increase the number to 500,000 students by 2020. The availability of funding for academic opportunities contrasts sharply with the proposal in the Trump administration’s FY 2019 budget to cut funding for the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs by 74.9 percent.
As a result of these efforts, China-Latin America cultural cooperation has evolved over the course of a few years from sporadic efforts to institutionalized exchanges. Even though these programs promise to foster cultural and economic ties across the Pacific, they also strategically align with President Xi’s “Chinese Dream” of becoming a global leader by 2050.
The growing economic presence of China in Latin America has been met with a warm reception throughout the region, where leaders have hailed the opportunity to diversify and grow developing economies. The embrace of economic relationships is a historic moment for the region, but it shouldn’t be done blindly. In our recommendations at the end of this document, we offer solutions for continuing to grow economic collaboration with China responsibly.
Russia doubles down on its misinformation and sharp-power activities
Russia’s economic relationship with Latin America is much less developed and is driven by Russia’s more limited economic capacity and a more straightforward political agenda. Both Russia and China are members of the BRICS group (which also includes Brazil, India and South Africa); but while China’s average GDP growth in recent years has remained above 6 percent, between 2014 and 2017, Russia’s GDP declined by 0.77 percent per year on average, down from a 7.69 percent growth rate average between 2005 and 2007. Under the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) of Luiz Inàcio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, Brazil often hewed to Chinese and Russian positions in multilateral bodies and as a bloc. That has changed under the government of President Michel Temer, though other semi- or non-democratic governments in the region such as Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba and, at times, Ecuador, have tended to toe the line with other like-minded non-democratic countries around the world.
Russia’s economic engagement in Latin America is focused on a limited set of countries and sectors. Its State-controlled oil company, Rosneft, is actively engaged with President Nicolas Maduro’s administration in Venezuela. Venezuela has granted Rosneft 49.9 percent collateral in the state oil company subsidiary CITGO, in return for $1.5 billion loan to stave off a potential default on international loan obligations. Meanwhile, concerns over a potential Venezuelan default and Russia’s creeping control over CITGO’s assets and operations in the United States, while Russia is under Ukraine-related sanctions, has raised the possibility of a buy-out by U.S. investors.
On the military side, between 2007 and 2016, Russia has supplied Nicaragua with 50 T-72B tanks (worth $70 million), 43 BTR-70 APC tanks, and 43 BMP-1 Tanks. Between 2008 and 2016 Venezuela has purchased a total of $4.1 billion worth of arms and 71 percent of these originated from Russia (14 percent came from China). Russia is Peru’s top arms supplier. Sales of $232 million worth of arms between 2008 and 2016 represented 31 percent of Peru’s total arms purchases. In Argentina, important arms deals with the Russians, including an order for Su-24 interceptor aircraft and a Pantsir S-1 air defense system, fell through after President Mauricio Macri’s election—replaced the Peronist administrations of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, which had courted Russian support over the previous 12 years.
In Nicaragua, Russia has reinforced relationships with Daniel Ortega’s government since he was re-elected president in 2007. It recently built a counter-drug center in Managua to train Nicaraguan police forces, and the center is expected to receive personnel from other parts of Central America in the near future. Russia also built a facility near the U.S. embassy outside Managua for communicating with its GLONASS satellite system, and it signed an agreement with Nicaragua’s government that allows Russian warships to access Nicaraguan ports.
President Vladimir Putin’s last visit to the region was in 2016, when he attended the APEC Economic Leader’s Meeting in Peru. Before that, he completed a multi-country trip in 2014 that culminated at the BRICS summit in Brazil. During that visit Putin agreed to forgive 90% of the Cuba’s $35 billion debt with Russia and, more recently, Rosneft began to provide Cuba with oil shipments, replacing Venezuela as one of the island-nation’s main suppliers of the commodity. Russia has also made important advances in its role of using cyber warfare to influence Latin America’s media and disseminate false information.
Perhaps Russia’s most ambitious sharp-power activity is linked to promotion of RT (Russia Today) in Spanish program, which effectively acts to advance Russian geopolitical interests and counter traditional media outlets, often trying to exploit existing political and social divisions in a country and suppress or distort political participation. RT in Spanish has been more successful at getting new viewers than any other foreign channel. By the end of 2016, RT in Spanish was available in almost every Latin American country: 27 TV cable providers offer RT in Spanish as a separate channel to its subscribers. Furthermore, the RT in Spanish YouTube Channel is reported to have almost 4.5 million monthly viewers and approximately 400,000 subscribers.
In recent months, concerns have arisen regarding possible Russian interference in the upcoming Mexican and Colombian elections. Earlier this year, a group of U.S. senators wrote the White House to express their concern over Russian interference in the Mexican election process. Since 2016, RT in Spanish has broadcast a weekly video blog titled “the Battle for Mexico” that frames the U.S. as an existential threat to Mexico and calls for the support of one of the Mexican presidential candidates. Moreover, an online portal that allows Mexicans living abroad to register to vote has received the largest number of visits from computers in Russia, with 65 percent of these based in of St. Petersburg, home to the Internet Research Agency that is linked with Russia’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. The online portal was created by the Mexican Institute of National Elections (INE), and the INE has collaborated with firms such as Alphabet to minimize potential Russian interference.
A changing landscape
Even though Russia lacks the resources that China has to assert influence in Latin American affairs, Moscow benefits from the influence it gained in the region in the 20th century particularly during the Cold War, and it most certainly will capitalize on opportunities to gain standing in the Western Hemisphere.
The activities cited above are just some of the examples of how extra-hemispheric powers are rapidly changing the political and economic landscape of a hemisphere where the U.S. has long enjoyed largely unrivaled influence. As a consequence of the growth of trade with China and Chinese lending to the region, Latin American countries now have access to different markets and to sources of finance that are different from those traditionally offered or supported by the United States. These alternative markets respond to both the region’s traditional products (natural resources) and development need (infrastructure). At the same time, China and Russia are pushing to expand their diplomatic weight and soft and sharp power in the region.
The changing economic landscape in the region is not inherently bad or a threat, but the region must work together to make sure change happens—as much as possible—on its own terms. The countries of the region, including the United States, can work together to ensure that in a changing geo-political environment, hemispheric values and norms concerning open societies, human rights, and democracy are not undermined. The opportunities and challenges presented by this shifting geopolitical and hemispheric balance is a shared interest and should be at the top of the agenda for collaboration across the Americas.
- The countries of the Americas should work together to adopt sustainable development strategies. The emergence of China as a major trading partner is good news for economies in need of diversity, but it doesn’t come without cost (resource depletion and disrespect for intellectual property rights are of particular concern). Opportunities for new investment are always welcome, but they should come in alignment with our shared values, human rights, and cultural norms. Regional trade agreements such as the Pacific Alliance, and the trade talks underway between Mercosur and the European Union and the TPP—jettisoned by the Trump administration but now reborn as the 11 member CPTPP—are important steps in reaffirming and protecting economic openness, intellectual property rights and sustainable development.
- The countries of the Americas should develop strong new incentives for transparent investment and opportunities for businesses and workers across the region. Last year, over 90 percent of the U.S.’s Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) financing flowed into clean energy investments, up from 61 percent in 2016. More financing needs to be directed toward basic infrastructure to encourage companies across the hemisphere to invest and compete.
- On the other hand, U.S. development assistance should strategically focus on improving investor confidence through institutional development in the rule of law. A step forward would be the passage of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act (BUILD Act), a bipartisan bill that aims to consolidate multiple federal programs into one new development finance corporation for greater efficiency in the implementation of U.S. foreign aid and development money. Similar efforts should be considered in Latin America for all investors.
- The U.S. still has an opportunity to lead regional strategy on trade and economic development. Instead of threatening to withdraw from NAFTA, the U.S. should work to update the agreement in a way that enhances its interests and those of its partners. From there, the U.S. should use a successful renegotiation of NAFTA to update and expand trade relationships with other regional partners, making trade fairer and more responsible for all parties. (For more, please see our paper on trade).
- Greater transparency and accountability in investment and public procurement through the adoption of more effective standards for investment is equally important, particularly as a counterbalance to the concerns about closed-door dealings, corruption and unfair investment practices that have surrounded Chinese and Russian economic activities in the region. A regional coalition of like-minded governments, including the U.S., should work to develop a strategy that includes, but is not limited to, working to adopt an equivalent to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. (For more, please see our paper on corruption.)
- Given the new hemispheric competitive landscape, it makes sound economic and political sense to strengthen opportunities for intra-regional educational and people-to-people exchange, both within Latin America and with the U.S. (through endangered programs such as the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs), precisely at a time when China is seeking to ramp up its cultural and educational capital in the region through state-funded exchange and educational programs. (For more, please see our paper on educational exchanges.)
- The region must move expeditiously, in collaboration with the U.S., to strengthen cybersecurity, and reinforce military cooperation. The continued resilience of democratic institutions across the hemisphere requires protecting the integrity of elections, curbing the spread of disinformation campaigns, and countering trans-border weapons trafficking—all vital priorities for promoting regional stability, sound development, and the protection of human rights and democracy.
- The nations of the Americas should continue to work in pursuit of strengthening of open societies, as a fundamental and common goal for us all. In this regard, regional governments should work together with private companies, NGOs, and Washington to develop and implement tools to monitor and counter efforts to undermine democracy and spread disinformation. Private U.S. companies such as Alphabet have launched initiatives like “Protect Your Election,” which offers a suite of free tools for publishers, journalists, NGOs, and election monitoring sites to provide protection against digital attacks. Other tools, like the German Marshall Fund’s Hamilton 68, which displays data about Russian propaganda on Twitter, and the website Verificado MX in Mexico, are vital for identifying disinformation and propaganda campaigns. The region should seek to better share these efforts and explore a central coordinating point across the hemisphere to address this issue potentially housed in an independent think tank or university.
Carolina Barco, Colombia
Former Foreign Minister & Ambassador to the United States
Enrique García, Bolivia
Former President of CAF: Development Bank of Latin America
Marc Grossman, United States
Vice Chairman of the Cohen Group,
Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Arturo Sarukhan, Mexico
Former Ambassador to the United States
Tomas Bilbao, United States
Managing Director, Avila Strategies
Diana Correa Corrales, Mexico
Professor of Sociology, Economics, and Politics, Tecnológico de Monterrey
Javier Corrales, United States
Dwight W. Morrow 1895 Professor of Political Science, Amherst College
María Mercedes Cuéllar, Colombia
Former Minister of Economic Development
Lucia Dammert, Peru
Associate Professor, Universidad de Santiago de Chile
Guy Edwards, United Kingdom
Research Fellow, Brown University
Mark Feierstein, United States
Senior Advisor, Albright Stonebridge Group
Former Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Obama Administration
Jose W. Fernandez, United States
Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
Marco Antonio Fernández Martínez, Mexico
Professor, School of Government, Tecnológico de Monterrey
Coordinator, Anticorruption and Education Program, México Evalúa
Kenneth N. Frankel, Canada
President, Canadian Council for the Americas
Juan S. Gonzalez, United States
Associate Vice President, The Cohen Group
David N. Greenlee, United States
Former Ambassador to Bolivia, Paraguay
Carlos Antonio Heredia Zubieta, Mexico
Associate Professor, Department of International Studies, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE)
Donna Hrinak, United States
President, Boeing Latin America
Former Ambassador to Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic
Richard L. Huber, United States
Edna Camelia Jaime Treviño, Mexico
Founder and Director, México Evalúa
Tomislav Kuljis, Bolivia
President, Hipermaxi S.A.
Beatriz Leycegui, Mexico
Partner, SAI Law & Economics
Angel Gustavo Lopez Montiel, Mexico
Professor of Political Science, Tecnológico de Monterrey
William McIlhenny, United States
Senior Non Resident Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Adriana Mejía Hernández, Colombia
Executive Director, Instituto de Ciencia Política Hernán Echavarría Olózaga
Mauricio Meschoulam Uziel, Mexico
Director of the Mexico Research Center for Peace
Andrés Molano Rojas, Colombia
Academic Director, Instituto de Ciencia Política Hernán Echavarría Olózaga
Frank Mora, United States
Director & Professor, Kimberly Green Latin America and Caribbean Center, Florida International University
Patricio Navia, Chile
Clinical Professor, Liberal Studies, New York University
Ivan C. Rebolledo, United States
Managing Partner, TerraNova Strategic Partners LLC
Julissa Reynoso, United States
Former Ambassador to Uruguay
Partner, Winston & Strawn
Iliana Rodríguez Santibañez, Mexico
Director, Law and International Affairs Program, Tecnológico de Monterrey, Mexico City
Christopher Sabatini, United States
Lecturer, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Director, Global Americans
Dee Smith, United States
CEO, Strategic Insight Group
Vice-Chair, Advisory Council of LLILAS/Benson Latin American Studies and Collections, University of Texas at Austin
Benito Sotelo, Mexico
Director, Legislative Analysis, Tecnológico de Monterrey
Carlos Andrés Uribe, Colombia
President, Ladrillera Santafé
Antonio Garza, United States
Former Ambassador to Mexico
Counsel, White & Case
Eric Jacobstein, United States
Senior Policy Advisor, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Charles Shapiro, United States
President, World Affairs Council of Atlanta
Former Ambassador to Venezuela
Moisés Wasserman, Colombia
Professor and Former Rector, Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Alexander F. Watson, United States
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs
Brandon Yoder, United States
Senior Professional Staff Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee