President Alberto Fernández’s state visit to Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) this month was tragic for Argentina—its national interests, its reputation as a democratic voice in the region, and moderates within Peronism who sincerely believe in the government as a tool for social justice and progress.
Russia’s posture in Latin America is far more threatening to the U.S. than that of China.
In 2022, the United States will find that after a few initial signs of hope, the hemisphere to which it is intimately bound by ties of geography, commerce, and family is more dangerous, less democratic, less stable, less willing to cooperate, and more engaged than ever with its extra-regional rivals.
The United States must prepare for the worst: a Chile that turns inward, faces more civil violence, and ceases to play a stabilizing role in the region.
The Chilean election poses a positive, if selective, narrative about Chile’s past and its remarkable transformation, against a new generation’s discontent with some parts of that transformation and the problems it has generated or failed to resolve.
The United States no longer has the luxury to scold its partners in the region. Washington has never faced a hemisphere so politically disposed to resist U.S. pressure, or so fully enabled by an adversary’s money to do so.
U.S. military role should combine traditional missions in the region with adaptations supporting transparency, rule-of-law, and strengthening partner nation institutions.
In Guyana, as in other parts of Latin America, the United States should not attempt to block the government or others from doing business with the PRC and its companies, but rather, to continue to insist on transparency, the rule of law, and competent government institutions.
For Latin American governments and consumers, as well as for the United States and other global actors, therefore, the question of DiDi Chuxing and the expanding presence of Chinese e-commerce companies in general is particularly urgent.
Chinese companies have played a key part in building Cuba’s telecommunications infrastructure, a system the regime uses to control its people, just as the CCP does within its own borders.
